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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990's, the public utilities sector in the European Union has gone through substantial
structural reforms that included liberalization of the market, large privatizations of state-owned
utilities and the establishment of independent agencies to regulate public utilities. The European
Commission promoted these reforms in an attempt to improve the efficiency and service quality of
EU utilities, to boost their investments and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
governmental intervention in the market. The extent of liberalization, the regulatory environment
and the degree of privatisation, however, vary considerably across member states and across
industries, justifying an analysis of their implications for public utilities’ behaviour.
In this paper we argue that regulatory institutions and the residual presence of state
ownership following partial privatization both have an influence on EU public utilities’ investment
and financial decisions, and that this influence is entwined with Government political orientation
(partisanship). Notwithstanding the new regulatory and market reforms, in fact, politicians may still
try to pursue their partisan goals by interfering with (private and state owned) regulated utilities’
decisions, partly to be reelected partly to achieve their personal most favored policy outcome.1 We
thus analyse how the creation of new regulatory institutions, like independent regulatory agencies,
affected privatized and partially privatized utilities’ decisions and to what extent these new
governmental entities have constrained the incidence of political interference.
The rationale behind the creation of Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) lies in the
attempt to insulate the policy maker from political interference that may manoeuvre regulated
firms’ decisions, particularly when firm ownership is in the hand of the government.

However,

like in all new institutional entities, the degree of independence and, in turn, the credibility of the
IRA depends on how much power the Government delegates to the IRA when it is established. Why
is regulatory discretion so critical? Institutions that limit political interference are supposed to
enhance the regulatory credibility and its commitment. On the contrary, lack of independence
reduces the credibility of the regulatory commitments. In this case, whenever regulators cannot
commit to long-term regulated prices, they may have an incentive to reduce ex post – i.e. once the
firm's investments are sunk - the regulated rates they had set, in order to benefit consumers at the
expense of the firm's owners. Regulatory time inconsistency thus deprives the regulated firm’s
investment incentives. State ownership (even if partial) may, in principle, alleviate regulatory
opportunism through direct control of firms’ decisions, but it might also exacerbate it, especially if
the Government's agenda changes over time for (typically short-term) political purposes. In
1

See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for a general review of the impact of partisan politics and ideology; and Person and
Tabellini (1999) and Persson (2002), among the others, for an analysis of the effect of the role of political institutions in
shaping economic policies.
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addition, the Government (and more generally politicians) can promote (or thwart) liberalization,
privatization and regulatory reforms in various directions, depending on its – either pro-firm or proconsumers - ideology/political stance even in presence of an independent entity.
This paper examines the investment and financial decisions of regulated utilities by taking
explicitly into account the evolution of key institutional features that characterized the public
utilities sector in Europe in the past two decades, namely: (i) varying degrees of independence of
regulatory agencies; (ii) varying degrees of state ownership within regulated public utilities, and
(iii) the government’s political orientation, as this may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to
be either pro-firm or pro-consumers. The econometric analysis uses firm level data for a large
panel of publicly traded EU utilities in energy, telecommunication, transport and water industries
from 1994 and 2005, which we complement with country and sector specific variables to cover the
regulatory framework and the political environment.
The time-inconsistency problem in regulation (the so called hold up problem) and the
implication of state vs. private ownership of utilities have both attracted the interest of economic
literature.2 Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) show that both privatization and independent regulation
enhance the commitment power of regulators by rendering more credible the regulator’s
interventions. As shown by Laffont and Tirole (1991), under state ownership the government could
force the regulator to use the firm’s assets for policy objectives (e.g. to extend the universal service
obligation or to provide the service in geographically disadvantaged areas) rather than to pursue
profit maximization. Politicians’ discretion may thus impair the regulators’ commitment capability.
On the contrary under private ownership, the double control by shareholders, on one side, and by
the regulator, on the other side, would provide proper incentives to managers. Levy and Spiller
(1994) show that regulatory independence improves the regulators' ability to make long-term
commitments to regulatory policies and that, therefore, sunk investments are less likely
expropriated ex post. In a more general framework, Martimort (2006) shows that contract
incompleteness and, more specifically, state ownership and limits to regulatory commitment may
affect the decision to privatize the utility as well as its ex post performance. On the one hand,
private ownership provides managers with stronger incentives to invest in cost reducing activities
that secure larger benefits and higher (implicit or explicit) rewards. On the other hand, the promise
not to intervene ex post is more credible under private production than under state ownership, and
private firms are thus predicted to invest optimally, because regulatory commitment is (supposed to
be) more pronounced.

2

See, for example, Newbery (1999; ch. 2) and the survey by Armstrong and Sappington (2007); see also Shleifer
(1998) for a comparison of the implications of state vs. private ownership.
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More recently, the literature has focused on how the institutional framework and, in
particular, the political stance of the government may affect regulatory reforms and outcomes.
Laffont (1996) shows that, in the presence of a privately-owned monopoly, a change from a proconsumer to a pro-firm government leads to a change in the regulatory regime from cost-plus to
fixed price regulation which in turn is expected to lead the regulated firms to reduce costs.3
Guerriero (2010) analyses the determinants of the adoption of incentive regulation and shows that
“performance based regulation” is more likely where regulators are elected, political competition is
less harsh, and regulatory resources are more abundant. Potrafke (2010), using data for 21 OECD
countries from 1975 to 2003, finds that the government’s ideology has a strong influence on the
deregulation process, specifically that a right-wing and market-oriented political orientation appear
as the driving force of privatization and product market deregulation4. Political institutions and
politics, however, may also affect firms’ decisions. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) theoretically analyse
the behaviour of private and public enterprises in situations where politicians try to influence firms
to pursue political objectives. They show that “an important determinant of whether politicians want
firms to be private or public is their ability to get tangible political benefits out of public ownership.
The greater the independence of public firms from politicians, the less attractive is public ownership
for politicians” [pp. 1022-1023]. Henisz and Zelner (2001) and Zelner and Henisz (2006) analyse
and empirically investigate the impact of political institutions on regulated firms’ investment
decisions and find that the credibility of the political regime positively affects firms’ investment
decisions.
In this paper, we take the suggestions of this recent strand of the literature seriously and we
investigate the impact of the political environment, along with independent regulation and state
partial ownership, on EU utilities’ investment and financial decisions.
Regulatory outcomes and interventions, however, are affected not only by the degree of
regulatory independence or by the Government’s stake in the firm, or by political interference, but
also by firms’ strategic decisions. Theoretical analysis suggests that for example regulated firms can
lobby regulators to obtain favourable outcomes (Evans et. al, 2008), or they can use capital structure
to constrain regulators’ lack of commitment. Spiegel and Spulber (1994 and 1997) show that the
strategic use of capital structure can shield the regulated firms’ investment incentives against
regulatory opportunism because regulators may decide to keep regulated rates relatively high in
order to minimize the risk of financial distress. By allowing the firm to raise its leverage and
become exposed to bankruptcy risk, the regulator ties his/her own hands not to reduce the regulated
3

See also Laffont (2000) for a more general and complete analysis on the interaction among regulatory interventions,
firm’s behavior and politics.
4
These results are consistent with previous findings by Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2003).
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rates ex-post, thus disciplining the lack of commitment problem that curbs the investment incentives
of the regulated firm. This theory, thus establishes a strategic relationship among price regulation,
investment and leverage - through bankruptcy costs. Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi and Spiegel
(hereafter, BCRS 2010), using a large panel of EU utilities, provide empirical evidence that the
relationship between financial leverage and regulated rates exists.
This paper departs from existing work on several dimensions. First, while most studies
typically focus on utilities in developing countries, we test our models on a large panel of European
firms. Second although other papers do examine the relationship between investment and regulatory
framework or independence, they neglect its interactions with firm ownership and government
partisanship. In our econometric analysis of EU regulated firms’ investment decisions, we use the
Euler equation approach to test whether the equilibrium level of investment changes when the
regulator is independent and when the firm is partially owned by the state while also controlling for
the impact of the Government’s political orientation (i.e. pro-consumers versus pro-firm ideology).
Thirdly, next to investment, we also examine the capital structure decisions of utilities, as this was
recognised by BCRS (2010) to have an impact on the regulated rates of privately-controlled firms
subject to an IRA; moreover, the huge increase of EU public utilities’ indebtedness and its
consequences for investment have been identified as a serious problem by governmental
institutions.5 However, differently from BCRS (2010), we estimate a dynamic leverage equation
that allows us to estimate the long run impact of an IRA on firms’ leverage, and we use a
continuous variable, rather than a discrete one to measure the government’s stake in the regulated
firms and this minimizes the problem of assigning control on the basis of an arbitrary threshold.
More importantly, we also estimate the impact of regulation and indebtedness on investment.
Our results show that regulatory independence does matter for investment as well as for
financial decisions of regulated firms. More specifically, investment increases when an IRA is in
place, or the more independent is the regulator, and this effect is independent of firm ownership,
while financial leverage increases when an IRA is in place, but only if the regulated firm is
privately controlled. Finally the government’s political orientation appears to matter for investment
decisions, as firm investment is found to increase under more conservative (pro-firm) governments,
but this effect appears to revert if the IRA exists, and the higher is regulatory independence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing empirical
evidence. In Section 3, we describe the institutional context and in Section 4 the dataset. In Sections
5

In the U.K., a joint study of the Department of Trade and Industry and the HM Treasury (DTI-HM, 2004) has
expressed a concern about the high leverage of U.K. utilities and argued that it "could imply greater risks of financial
distress, transferring risk to consumers and taxpayers and threatening the future financeability of investment
requirements" (DTI-HM, 2004, p. 6). Similarly, Ofgem (2008) has recently started to consider how to intervene in the
event of financial distress of transport electric utilities.
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5 and 6, we present the econometric strategy and the empirical results from estimating investment
and leverage regressions, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related empirical literature
The empirical literature that focuses on the relationship between regulation and investment,
rarely examines its implications with firm capital structure, and practically never extends the
analysis to consider the role of firm ownership and political partisanship or regulatory
independence.
Wallsten (2001) shows that, when an IRA is in place, the privatization of telecoms providers
in Latin America and Africa is associated with larger investment in connection capacity and phone
penetration, but not otherwise. Using data of telecoms companies in Latin American and Caribbean
countries from 1980 to 1997, Gutiérrez (2003) shows that regulatory independence has a positive
impact on the number of phone lines per capita. Cubbin and Stern (2005) show, for a panel of
electric utilities in developing countries from 1980 to 2001, that the existence of an independent
regulator is associated with higher generating capacity. More recently, using industry level data
from 13 OECD countries, Egert (2009) shows that incentive regulation implemented jointly with an
independent sector regulator has a strong positive impact on investment in network industries,
though when taken separately the two variables do not display any significant effect. Cambini and
Rondi (2009) study the relationship between access regulation, financial structure and investment
decisions for the 15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTO), analyzing if financial
variables can be used by incumbent companies as a strategic device to influence the regulator’s
tariff setting decisions the regulated firms’ investment decisions. They find that an increase in
leverage positively affects both retail and wholesale rates, and that an increase in leverage has a
negative impact on competition, but a positive effect on the PTOs’ investment rate. Notably,
however, none of these studies include, or control for, firm ownership and political orientation.
Moreover, most of the studies focus on developing countries while we concentrate on a large panel
of EU utilities shortly after the introduction of market reforms.
Political institutions also affect investment decisions of regulated firms. Henisz and Zelner
(2001) investigate the impact of political variables on regulated firms’ investment for a sample of
telecommunications operators in 147 countries during the period 1960–1994, and find that stronger
constraints on managers’ discretion generated by the credibility of the political regime (i.e. the
presence of low and upper chambers, judiciary and some federal institutions, the effective systems
of checks and balances, etc.) positively affect firms’ investment decisions. Zelner and Henisz
(2006), using panel data for state-owned Electric Utilities from 78 countries (1970-1994), find that
6
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the effect of political institutions that constraints the behaviour of political actors on investment in
electrical infrastructures varies with the level of interest group competition (households vs.
industrial users) faced by electric utilities.
Existing evidence on capital structure decisions regulated firms is consistent with the main
result that financial leverage increases with the introduction and the severity of regulation. The high
leverage of regulated utilities is well-known and well-documented phenomenon in the U.S.6.
Taggart (1985) finds that U.S. electric utilities increased their debt-to-equity ratios following the
introduction of rate regulation in various states in the U.S. in the 1910’s. Dasgupta and Nanda
(1993) find, for a cross-section of U.S. electric utilities, that firms operating in less pro-firm
regulatory environments tend to have higher debt-equity ratios. Klein, Phillips and Shiu (2002),
using a cross-section of U.S. property-liability insurers, show that the degree of price regulation and
its stringency is positively related with the leverage of insurers. Bulan and Sanyal (2005) find, for a
panel of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities between 1990 and 2000, that they reduced their debtto-total assets ratios in response to the higher regulatory and competitive uncertainty that followed
deregulation. Correia da Silva, Estache and Jarvela (2006) study the implications of increased debt
for investment. They examine 121 regulated utilities in 16 less developed countries from 1991 to
2002 and find that, as leverage steadily increases over time investment levels begin to fall. To the
best of our knowledge, BCRS (2010) is the first paper to examine empirically the relationship
between capital structure, regulated prices, ownership structure, and regulatory independence using
a large panel of EU utilities. The results show that: (i) utilities tend to have higher leverage when
they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency (IRA); (ii) leverage
Granger-causes regulated prices (but not vice versa) when firms are privately controlled and
regulated by an IRA (when firms are state controlled, leverage and regulated prices do not Grangercause one another). However, none of these studies focuses on the long run effect of regulatory
independence on the increase of firm’s leverage after controlling for firm’s ownership and political
partisanship.

3. Institutional features
Until the early Nineties, with the only UK exception, public utilities in Europe were largely
characterized by vertical integration, state monopoly and public ownership. Ministries,
governmental bodies or committee or local governments were in charge of regulating the market
and set tariffs and quality standards. However, in that period regulation was more viewed as a sort
6

See for example, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984).
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of "political negotiation" among firms and the Ministry itself rather than as an instrument to recreate competitive conditions while amending market failures. Regulated rates were mainly set to
counterbalance the rise of inflation and utilities were often asked to absorb labour units whenever
unemployment increased. The result of this “un-incentive regulation” was ill performing
monopolies and inefficiency (Megginson and Netter, 2001).
Within EU member states, the reforms of the public utility sector were prompted by the
European Commission through various Directives, aimed at redesigning the legal and regulatory
frameworks so as to enhance economic incentives to raise cost efficiency, service quality, and new
investment. The utility sector was therefore gradually liberalized with involvement of private
investors in the ownership and control of assets. The Commission, however, though in favour of
privatisation, left the decision about public utilities’ ownership structure entirely in the hands of
national governments. As of 2010, privatization of public utilities within EU member states is far
from complete, and central and local governments still hold majority (and minority) ownership
stakes in many regulated utilities.7
In order to regulate public utilities and avoid the potential conflict of interest by the
Government in presence of state owned companies, the European Commission has been promoting,
since the mid-Eighties, the delegation of regulatory competencies from central Governments to
Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs), which are designed to act on the behalf of central
government, but are not part of any State Departments or Ministries. These new regulatory
institutions would act independently of the ministerial departments, with their own specialized staff
and with precise and specific tasks. OECD describes them as “one of the most widespread
institutions of modern regulatory governance” (OECD, 2002). Regulatory tasks typically involve
price setting decisions, both at retail and wholesale level - whenever granting access to essential
facility is needed to the development of market competition, the definition of entry conditions, the
imposition of quality standards and all the technical rules to use or access to existing infrastructures.
Within this set of regulatory rules, utilities are free to make their own decisions about investments
and their financing, using either debt or equity so as to maximize firm’s value.
The implementation of market reforms varies considerably across countries and sectors.
Reforms are most advanced in the telecom industry where independent regulatory agencies (IRA)
have been established in virtually all member states and most of the companies are (at least
partially) privatized.8 Market liberalization reforms are also advanced in the energy sector, where
the majority of electric and gas utilities are subject to regulation by an IRAs. However, many large
7

See Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) for a recent analysis.
In Appendix 2 we report data of establishment of an IRA, the privatization year and the ownership status (up to the
end of 2007) for all the EU 27 countries in the energy (electricity and gas) and telecommunications sectors.
8
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utilities are still controlled by the government, particularly in France, Germany, Italy and Portugal
and especially so in the natural gas industry. Finally, structural reforms in water supply and in
transportation imfrastructure (docks and ports, airports and freight motorways) are still lagging
behind; with the exception of the U.K., most water and transportation utilities are still controlled by
central and local governments and still subject to regulation by ministries or other branches of the
government rather than by independent regulatory agencies.
4. The dataset
For the empirical analysis we use an unbalanced panel of 92 publicly traded utilities and
transportation infrastructure operators from EU 15 founding member states tracked from 1994 to
2005.9 The data covers firms that are either regulated by independent regulatory agencies or by
ministries, governmental committees, or local governments, and with various degrees of state
ownership.
Accounting and financial market data have been collected from Worldscope. To define
indebtedness we consider measures that capture the risk of the default.10 Our variable is the
textbook definition of leverage, i.e. the book value of financial debt (both long- and short-term)
divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the book value of equity. Investment is the
change in the fixed capital stock. In the econometric analysis we use the ratio of gross fixed
investment to capital stock at the replacement value.11 Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics
for the main variables used in the analysis. Appendix A1 defines and details how we constructed
the firm-level economic and financial variables used in the econometric analysis.
Among the 92 firms, 43 firms are privately-controlled throughout our sample, 25 are statecontrolled throughout our sample period, and 24 were privatized during our sample period. We

9

See also BCRS (2010) for a thorough description of the data and the sources used to construct the economic and
financial variables.
10
See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for a discussion of alternative leverage measures.
11
The accounting data from Worldscope only include historic cost valuations of fixed assets, which usually bear little
relation to current replacement cost of long-lived fixed capital assets. Hence, we calculate the replacement cost of the
capital stock using the perpetual inventory formula: pt+1Kt+1 = ptKt(1-δ)(pt+1/pt) + pt+1It+1, where pt is the country-specific
implicit price deflator for gross capital formation in period t sourced by the OECD, Kt is the fixed capital stock in period
t, It is the investment flow in period t, and δ is the depreciation rate (see Bond and Meghir, 1994). We derived the sector
specific depreciation rates from Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates reported in “Rates of Depreciation, Service
Lives, Declining Balance Rates, and Hulten-Wykoff Categories and used 4.4% for energy, gas and water supply, 3% for
freight roads concessionaires, 8% for telecommunications, and 4.5% for ports and airports. To obtain the starting values
for the perpetual inventory formula, we assumed that replacement cost valuations are equal to historic cost valuations
for the earlier available capital stock data (usually 1994). Whenever a major acquisition or divestiture may cause a
major discontinuity in the investment rate series, we split the firm’s time-series into two units accounting for the period
“before” and “after” the event, provided that the split unit has at least three consecutive observations.
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employ a continuous variable constructed by Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), which uses the weakest
link approach to measure the state’s ultimate control rights (UCR).12
All firms operate in regulated sectors, i.e. where entry and prices are subject to regulatory
oversight either by the state or by an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA). In order to study the
effect of regulatory independence on firms’ investment and financial behavior, we use an IRA
dummy that is equal to 1 in all years in which the firm was subject to regulation by an IRA and
equals 0 otherwise. The IRA dummy was constructed using data and information on IRAs’
inception dates taken from Gilardi (2002 and 2005) for the energy and telecommunications sectors
in which IRAs already exist in all countries in our sample. We complemented this data by drawing
from additional sources information about the presence of IRAs within freight roads, airports, port
and docks, and water supply. As mentioned in Section 3, we found that only the water industry in
the UK has an independent regulatory agency. In addition to the IRA dummy, we also directly
include the Index of formal Regulatory Independence (see Gilardi 2002, 2005) in order to control
for differences in the regulatory environment across countries and sectors. The index is obtained by
taking the average of five key dimensions of the regulatory framework: (i) the status of the agency
head (for example, term of office and appointment and dismissal procedure), (ii) the status of the
members of management board, (iii) relationship with government and parliament, (iv) financial
and organizational autonomy, and (v) regulatory competencies.13 It goes from 0 (no independence)
to 1 (full independence).
The Political Orientation Index is used to capture whether the government’s political stance
is more pro-firm (right-wing) or pro-consumer (left-wing). Insofar as governments interfere with
the regulator’s agenda (and the regulator is ultimately less independent), this Index is also a proxy
of the regulatory climate. The index ranges from 0 (extreme left wing) to 10 (extreme right wing)
and is equal to a weighted average of scores given in expert surveys supporting government (see
Huber and Inglehart, 1995, and Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009).
Finally, in the leverage equation, we also use the Investor Protection index, i.e. the “antidirector rights” index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and updated by Pagano and Volpin
12

See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002).
According to this approach, the UCR of the state is simply equal to the minimum ownership stake along the control
chain (i.e., the weakest link). In BCRS (2010) a dichotomous dummy variable captures the public vs. private control
status.
13
Unfortunately, the index is time invariant and is not available for water utility sector and for transportation
infrastructure, where the IRA does not exist. Regulatory independence varies considerably across European countries
and across sectors. In telecommunications, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and the U.K. appear to have the most independent
regulators, while Belgium and Germany have the least independent regulators. In electric and gas, Austria, Belgium,
and Italy appear to have the most independent regulators, while Spain seems to have the least independent regulators
and Germany does not have an IRA dedicated for energy sectors.
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(2005). The index goes from 0 to 7 as shareholders’ rights become more and more protected. We
expect that higher values of this index would be associated with lower cost of equity and hence
lower leverage.

5. An Empirical Model of Investment with Independent Regulation, Mixed-Ownership
and Political Regimes
In this section we examine the impact of regulatory independence and (partial) state
ownership on the equilibrium level of the investment of the regulated firm, taking government’s
political orientation into account.
5.1 The Empirical Model and the Estimation Strategy
For an empirical model of investment to be tested on firm panel data, we use the Euler
equation approach, introduced by Abel (1980) and developed by Bond and Meghir (1994). The
Euler equation derives from the first-order conditions for the optimal capital stock and therefore
describes the optimal path of firm investment. It is not an investment rule where investment is a
function of predetermined or exogenous variables but, rather, a structural relation between
investment rates in successive periods as derived from dynamic optimization in the presence of
symmetric and quadratic adjustment costs that take the form of foregone production (see
Schiantarelli, 1996). The advantage of the Euler equation model of company investment is that it
captures the influence of current expectations of future profitability on current investment decisions
without having to rely on stock market valuations of the firm as in the usual Q model approach,
where the average Q is constructed from financial market data and is a poor proxy for marginal Q.14
To obtain an empirical model, the firm is assumed to maximize the present discounted value
of current and future net cash flows. Let Lit denote variable factor inputs, wit the price of variable
factors, pit the price of output, Iit fixed investment, Kit the capital stock, pIit the price of investment
goods, ρt+j the nominal discount factor between period t and period t+j, δ the rate of depreciation,
F(Kit, Lit) the production function and G(Iit, Kit) the adjustment cost function and Et(.) the
expectation operator conditional on information available at t.15 The firm solves the following
optimization problem:

14

This is obtained by using the first-order condition for investment to eliminate the shadow value of capital from the
Euler equation and by estimating the Euler equation itself.
15
This concise exposition of the Euler equation approach closely follows Bond and Meghir (1994) and Bond, Elston,
Mairesse and Mulkay (2003).
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Max Et [Σj=0 ρt+j Π(Kit+j, Lit+j, Lit+j]
s.t.

(1)

Kit = (1-δ) Kit-1 + Iit

where Πit = pitF(Kit, Lit) - pitG(Iit, Kit) - witLit - pIitIit. The Euler equation characterizing the optimal
investment path relates the marginal adjustment costs in adjacent periods and can written as
follows:
- (∂Π/∂I)it = - (1- δ)ρt+1 Et (∂Π/∂I)it+1 +(∂Π/∂K)it
The symmetric adjustment cost function for the capital stock can be described by G(Iit, Kit) =
b/2 [(I/Kit – c]2Kit, where b reflects the importance of adjustment costs and c is the "normal" rate of
gross investment. Since we are dealing with imperfect market structures characterized by non
constant returns to scale – i.e. natural monopolies or imperfectly competitive markets with
dominant firms subject to regulatory agencies - the output price pit is assumed to depend on the
output, with a constant price elasticity of demand (ε). We therefore introduce the output to capital
ratio (Y/K)it to account for imperfect competition in the product market (see also Schiantarelli and
Georgoutsos, 1990).
The Euler equation can then be expressed as:
(I/K)it - γ1(I/K)2it = γ 2 Et(I/K)it+1 + γ 3[(Ω/K)it – Jit] - γ 4(Y/K)it + α

(2)

where Ωit = pitF(Kit, Lit) – pitG(Iit, Kit) – witLit is the gross operating profit and Jit is the real user cost
of capital (with Jit = (pIit/pit){1- (1-δ)ρt+1pIit+1/ pIit }), while the coefficients γ 1, γ 2, γ 3 and γ 4 can be
shown to be positive.16
To implement this model, the unobserved Et(I/K)it+1 is replaced by the realized (I/K)it+1 plus
a forecast error, and the (I/K)it+1 term is then moved to the left-hand side to obtain an econometric
model that is linear in variables. Finally, the cost of capital term can be replaced by time and firm
specific effects. The empirical specification that we estimate then takes the form:
(I/K)it+1 = β1(I/K)it - β2(I/K)2it - β3(Π/K)it + β4(Y/K)it + dit+1 + ηi+ νit+1

(3)

It can be shown that β1 ≥ 1 and β2≥ 1, while β3 >0 under the null hypotheses of perfect capital
markets. The coefficient β4 is positive under imperfectly competitive markets or when the company
is facing increasing return to scale. In our setting, while it is true that utilities typically face non
More specifically, it is possible to show that γ 1 = 1/(1+c); γ 2 = 1/ψ(1+c) where ψ = (pit/pit+1)[1/ (1-δ)ρt+1]; γ 3 =
1/bη(1+c) where η = (1 – 1/ε) is the mark up coefficient in a imperfect market; and γ 4 = 1/[b(1+c)(ε – 1)].

16
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constant returns to scale, they are also subject to price regulation by an IRA, a Ministry or other
governmental committee. One of the typical purposes of regulation is to ensure that the actions of
public utilities mimic those of unregulated companies which operate in a competitive environment.
Therefore, utilities prices should be set in order to reach the efficient result of competitive markets.
Moreover, public utilities services demand is typically price inelastic hence, ε < 1. Hence, even
though the utilities markets are imperfect, the sign of the coefficient β4 might become ambiguous in
a regulated setting as the two effects might compensate each other.
An attractive feature of the Euler equation approach, particularly interesting for our study, is
that equation (3) can be extended also to debt as a source of investment finance (Bond and Meghir,
1994). This allows us to test for the impact of bankruptcy risk and financial distress on regulated
utilities’ investment. The model assumes that the rate of interest paid by the firm on debt finance
may be an increasing function of debt issued, a situation that occurs whenever the firm faces a
bankruptcy risk, because the probability of bankruptcy is an increasing function of the amount of
the debt outstanding. It can be shown that the augmented Euler equation for capital stock can be
written as:
(I/K)it+1 = β1(I/K)it - β2(I/K)2it - β3(Π/K)it + β4(Y/K)it + β5(D/K)2it + dit+1 + ηi+ νit+1

(3bis)

where D/K is the financial debt to capital stock ratio. The additional term (D/K)2it thus controls for
the non-separability between investment and financial decisions. The sign on the debt coefficient,

β5, is expected to be negative if bankruptcy costs exist, and zero if there are no bankruptcy costs and
debt and investment decisions are separable. The negative coefficient reflects that the expected cost
of borrowing is not independent of the probability of bankruptcy and also that the probability of
bankruptcy decreases as the firm size increases for a given level of debt.
The main purpose of our test is to investigate the implications of independent regulation,
state ownership and government’s political orientation for the optimal capital accumulation of the
regulated firm. We thus add three variables to the Euler equation for investment: the dichotomous
IRA dummy which is equal to 1 if firm i was subject to regulation by an IRA in year t and is equal
to 0 otherwise, Government UCRit is a continuous variable measuring the ultimate control rights
held by the Government, Political Orientationit is an index of the government’s political orientation
ranging from 0 (extreme left) and 10 (extreme right) to proxy the pro-consumer vs. pro-firm
political stance of the government. Finally, in order to investigate whether the impact of
independent regulation varies with the government’s ownership stake and political orientation, we
also estimate a specification where IRA is interacted with Government UCR and, separately, with
13
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Political orientation. We therefore start with the baseline Euler equation model, which adds the
institutional variables:

( I / K ) it = β 0 + β1 ( I / K ) it −1 + β 2 ( I / K ) it2 −1 + β 3 (CF / K ) it −1 + β 4 (Y / K ) it −1 +
+ α1 IRAit + α 2GovernmentUCRit + α 3 PolOrientit + ηi + d t + ε it ,
(4)
We then add the interactions of IRA with Government UCR and with Political Orientation:

( I / K ) it = β 0 + β1 ( I / K ) it −1 + β 2 ( I / K ) it2 −1 + β 3 (CF / K ) it −1 + β 4 (Y / K ) it −1 +
+ α1 IRAit + α 2GovernmentUCRit + α 3 PolOrientit +

(4bis)

+ α 4GovernmentUCRit * IRAit + α 5 PolOrientit * IRAit + ηi + d t + ε it ,

The third model includes the squared debt term, which tests for the presence of bankruptcy costs:

( I / K ) it = β 0 + β1 ( I / K ) it −1 + β 2 ( I / K ) it2 −1 + β 3 (CF / K ) it −1 + β 4 (Y / K ) it −1 + β 5 ( D / K ) it2 −1 +
+ α1 IRAit + α 2GovernmentUCRit + α 3 PolOrientit + ηi + d t + ε it ,

(5)

And the fourth specification adds again the interacted terms:

( I / K ) it = β 0 + β1 ( I / K ) it −1 + β 2 ( I / K ) it2 −1 + β 3 (CF / K ) it −1 + β 4 (Y / K ) it −1 + β 5 ( D / K ) it2 −1 +
+ α1 IRAit + α 2GovernmentUCRit + α 3 PolOrientit +

(5bis)

+ α 4 GovernmentUCRit * IRAit + α 5 PolOrientit * IRAit + ηi + d t + ε it ,

As an alternative to the IRA dummy, we also estimate the full set of specifications (4)-(5)
with the index of formal Regulatory Independence (see Gilardi 2002, 2005), which is available only
for sectors/countries where the IRA is present (electricity and gas industry, telecommunications
and, for the UK only, water supply) and allows us to control for differences in the regulatory
environment across countries and across sectors.

14
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For any given value of Government UCR and of political orientation, we can calculate the
total effect of the presence of the IRA as α1 + α4*Government UCR + α5*PolOrient, conditional on
different ownership and political patterns. The coefficient α1 thus measures the (limit) effect of the
IRA on leverage as both the Government’s shareholding and the Political Orientation index go to
zero, i.e., the effect of IRA on fully privately controlled firms and when the government in charge is
(extreme) leftwing. The coefficient α2 measures the direct effect of state ownership while the
coefficient α3 measures the direct effect of the government’s political orientation. Finally, the
coefficient α4 measures how the effect of IRA varies with Government ownership (from fully
public to fully private) while the coefficient α5 measures how the effect of IRA differs as the
Government

political

orientation

shifts

from

left

to

right.

The

interaction

terms

GovernmentUCR*IRA and Political orientation*IRA thus estimate whether the impact of the IRA is
different for firms controlled by the state or by private investors and for firms under a left- (proconsumer) or a right-wing (pro-firm) government, respectively.
To estimate equations (4) - (5bis), we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and
Bover (1995) linear generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which is especially
designed for dynamic models where the lagged dependent variable is included and some of the
regressors are not strictly exogenous. More specifically, we use the dynamic System-GMM model
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which deals with situations
where the lagged dependent variable is persistent and the lagged levels of the dependent variables
are weak instruments. This model estimates a system of level and first-differenced equations and
uses lags of first-differenced variables as instruments for equations in levels and lags of variables in
levels as instruments for equations in first-differences.17 For the validity of the GMM estimates it is
crucial, however, that the instruments are exogenous. We therefore calculate the two-step SarganHansen statistic under the null of joint validity of the instruments and report the resulting p-values
with the regression results. Since the Sargan-Hansen test may be weakened if there are too many
instruments (with respect to the number of observations), we follow a conservative strategy and use
no more than three (but mostly two) lags of the instrumenting variables.18 We finally report the

17

For estimation we used the xtabond2 Stata command created by David Roodman (2006).
Lagged values of right-hand variables are used as instruments: lagged levels are used in first-differences equations
and lags of first-differenced variables are used in levels equations. The instrument set also includes a dummy to account
for the presence of Golden Shares by the government and an index of political institutional disproportionality to control
for characteristics of institutional and political systems, which may have influenced the decision to privatize utilities and
to introduce the IRAs. Specifically we use the Political institutional Gallagher index of disproportionality that allows a
categorization of countries based on a majoritarian -consensual dimension and is a measure of government stability and
of the veto-power of minority parties The index is continuous; it equals zero when the apportionment of parliamentary
seats is exactly proportional to electoral results, and it increases as disproportionality increases (Bortolotti and Pinotti,
2008). All regressions include year dummies. Year, sector and country dummies are included as instruments.
18
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Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test to control for first order and second order correlation
in the residuals. If AR(2) is detected, instruments dated t-2 are invalid and only instruments dated t3 and earlier can be used.

5.2 Results
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, we report one-step GMM-System estimates of the Euler equation
models. To evaluate the impact of the regulatory independency we use the IRA dummy in Table 2.1
and the index of formal Regulatory Independence in Table 2.2. In both tables, Columns (3) and (4)
include the debt squared term which allows us to test for the presence of bankruptcy costs (see
Equations 5 and 5bis).
Our results show that the coefficients on lagged investment and lagged investment squared
terms have the right sign and are significant in all columns. More importantly, their magnitude is
close to 1 in absolute value as predicted by the theory (t-tests on the point estimates cannot reject
the hypothesis that the coefficients are one). This suggests that the investment dynamics implied by
the theory is supported by the data.

All estimated models however show the same inconsistency

with the theoretical model underlying the Euler investment equation, namely the lack of
significance of the coefficients on the cash flow term, our proxy for the gross operating profit. Since
the cash flow was predicted to have a negative and significant coefficient, this result suggests the
presence of imperfections such as asymmetric information and contract enforcement or incentive
problems in the capital markets (see Hubbard, 1998). We note that the coefficient on the output to
capital stock ratio is insignificant in all columns. As suggested in section 5.1, this might be due to
the combined effects of imperfect market competition in a regulated environment and of inelastic
demand of public utilities services that may compensate each other leading to an insignificant or
even negative estimated coefficient.
Finally, the point estimate of the coefficient on the lagged debt term has the expected
negative sign and is significantly different from zero, both in column (3) and in column (4). This
suggests that the investment and financing decisions for our sample of regulated utilities are not
separable due to the presence of deadweight costs associated to bankruptcy.

This result is

consistent with the idea of a strategic use of leverage that, through the bankruptcy threat, may
induce the regulator not to reduce ex-post regulated rates (as shown in BCRS, 2010), so as to allow
the regulated firm to follow the optimal investment path.

16
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We now turn to the coefficients of the institutional variables of interest: the IRA dummy, the
Government UCR and Political Orientation. The results in Table 2.1 show that the coefficient on
the lagged IRA term is positive and significant in all columns, which indicates that the equilibrium
level of investment is higher when the independent regulator exists. This result is consistent with
theory showing that regulatory independence improves the regulated firm’s investment incentives
(Levy and Spiller, 1994). The Government UCR coefficient, however, is not significantly different
from zero, a result which does not support theoretical predictions that investment is lower when the
firm is (fully or partly) owned by the state (see, for example, Martimort, 2006).19 Political
orientation is also insignificant, in columns (1) and (3), but when we add its interaction with IRA, in
columns (2) and (4), we find that the coefficients on the standalone variable turn positive and
significant. In contrast, Government UCR is never significant nor is its interaction with IRA.
We thus focus on the interrelations between IRA and political orientation in Columns (2)
and (4) to examine whether the increase in investment due to the presence of the IRA differs with
the pro-firm vs. pro-consumer political stance of the government. The coefficients α1 and α3 on the
IRA dummy and on the Political orientation control variable are both positive and significant while
their interaction, α5, is negative and also significant. α1 and α3 thus imply that utilities tend to invest
more when the IRA exists and when the government is conservative, hence pro-firm, while α5
suggests that, when the IRA is in place, the increase in investment is less pronounced if the
government is rightwing. To illustrate how the impact of the IRA on investment changes with
political orientation we graph in Figure 1 the partial effect of the IRA conditional on PolOrien (i.e.
the sum: α1 + α5*PolOrient) and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. To supplement the
analysis we also estimate and graphically depict in Figure 2 the partial effects of political
orientation, conditional on the presence of the IRA (α3 + α5*IRA).
Figure 1 shows that the positive effect of IRA on investment shrinks as the political
orientation index increases, i.e. as the government gets more pro-firm. Since we know from α3 that
pro-firm governments have a direct positive effect on investment, this result suggests that the
presence of the IRA somewhat has a counteracting influence on political interference. Further
insight can be derived from Figure 2 which shows how the marginal effect of political orientation
on IK varies with the presence of the IRA. As reported in column (2), the coefficient of Political
orientation is positive while its interaction with IRA is negative. The figure shows that the increase
in investment experienced by firms when governments are rightwing vanishes when the IRA is in
19

The lack of significance of the ownership variable is consistent with empirical evidence in Cambini and Rondi (2010)
for energy utilities in Italy, Spain, France, Germany and UK from 2000 to 2007. Results show that private and stateowned firms’ investment rates do not significantly differ.
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place. If the IRA exists (i.e. when the dummy is one), the total effect of political orientation is
summarized by the algebraic sum of the point estimates in Column (2): +0.008 – 0.013 = -0.005,
indicating that the IRA has a counteracting effect on political interference.
In Table 2.2 we replace the IRA dummy with the Regulatory Independence Index, which
graduates the formal level of regulatory independence from 0 (no independence) to 1 (full
independence). Although the index is time invariant, using a continuous variable, instead of a
dummy, allows us to account for differing levels of regulatory independence across countries and
sectors in which an IRA exists. The results are very similar to those in Table 2.1. The coefficient on
the Regulatory Independence Index is positive and significant, suggesting that the higher the
(formal) regulatory independence the higher the investment, while the ownership variables remain
insignificant in all specifications. Like in Table 2.1, Political Orientation turns significant in the
specifications that include the interacted terms (Columns (2) and (4)). Again the results suggest that
the positive effect of pro-firm (conservative) governments on regulated utilities’ investment
weakens and possibly reverts, as regulators get more independent. Figure 3 shows the effect of
regulatory independence on the investment rate conditional on changes in the government’s
political orientation, confirming that the increase in investment due to the presence of the IRA is
smaller under a rightwing government. Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the effect of political orientation
on investment as regulatory independence increases, and shows, consistently with the earlier
evidence, that the investment increase due to the rightwing government drops as regulatory
independence increases. The results with the index of Regulatory Independence on the subsample of
utilities that eventually got an IRA confirm the results we obtained using the IRA dichotomous
dummy for the full sample.

6.

Modeling

Capital

Structure

in

Heterogeneous

Regulatory

and

Political

Environments
In this section we investigate the impact of regulatory independence and (partial) state
ownership on the leverage of regulated firms, taking government’s political orientation into
account, and also examine whether the impact of regulatory independence differs with various
degree of state ownership and with different political orientation of the government.
6.1 The Leverage Equation and the Estimation Strategy
We estimate a dynamic leverage equation to account for possible adjustment process that
firms may follow whenever they want to obtain a target level of leverage. An attracting feature of
18
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the dynamic model is that it enables us to estimate the log-run effects of regulatory independence
that arise if firms adjust their leverage in response to the introduction of the IRA gradually over
time. Our baseline regression is the following:

Lit = α 0 + β1 Lit −1 + α1 IRAit + α 2GovernmentUCRit + α3 PolOrientit + α 4 Xit + α5 GDPGrowthit +

α 6 InvestorPr otectionit +ηi + dt + ε it ,

(6)

where Lit is the Book Leverage of firm i in year t, Lit-1 is the Book Leverage at time t-1 which
accounts for the adjustment process, IRAit is a dummy which is 1 when the independent regulatory
agency exists, Government UCRit is a continuous variable which measures the ownership stake held
by the state, the Political Orientation Index measures the left-to-right political stance of the
government in charge, Xit is a vector of firm-specific controls, Investor Protectionit is an index
which measures the legal protection of shareholders’ rights, and GDP Growth accounts for
differences in macroeconomic conditions over time across the 14 different countries of origin of our
sample firms, ηi and dt are firm and time fixed effects and εit is an error term. The vector Xit of
firm-specific controls includes various firm characteristics that were shown in the empirical
corporate finance literature to be reliable determinants of capital structure.20 The log of real total
assets controls for firm’s size (size is typically shown to have a positive effect of leverage), the ratio
of fixed to total assets reflects asset tangibility, the ratio of EBIT (earning before interests and
taxes) to total assets is a proxy for profitability and “efficiency” (more efficient firms are likely to
make higher earnings with the same assets), and the ratio of depreciation and amortization to total
assets is a proxy for non-debt tax shields (tax deductions for depreciations are substitutes for the tax
benefits of debt financing).
In order to investigate whether the impact of independent regulation varies with the
government’s ownership stake and political orientation, we also estimate a specification where IRA
is interacted with Government UCR and with Political orientation:

L it = α 0 + β 1 Lit −1 + α 1 IRA it + α 2 Government UCR it + α 3 PolOrient
+ α 4 Government UCR it * IRA it + α 5 P olOrient
+ α 6 X it + α 7 Investor Pr otection

it

it

it

+

* IRA it +

+ α 8 GDP Growth

it

(6bis)

+ η i + d t + ε it ,

Similarly to the investment equation, the specifications with the interacted terms allow us to
estimate the partial effect of the IRA on public utilities’ investment rate conditional on changes in
20

For common firm characteristics that are included in leverage regressions see for example, Titman and Wessels
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), and Frank and Goyal (2007).
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their ownership structure as well as on changes in the government’s political orientation. Besides
the direct average effect of the institutional variables, we therefore examine whether the impact of
the IRA on leverage is different for publicly- or privately-controlled firms, and across pro-firm or
pro-consumers governments, and we provide the graphical representation of all these effects.

6.2 Results
In Table 3 we present the one-step System-GMM estimates. The lagged values of the
Leverage terms are significant in all Columns. In Column (1) the point estimate is .494 suggesting
that a 10% increase in book leverage in year t is followed by a further increase of nearly 5% in year
t+1. Our results show that the various firm characteristics that we control are significant and their
signs are generally consistent with earlier empirical studies on the determinants of the capital
structure. The only exception is the negative and significant coefficient on fixed-to-total assets,
which is our proxy for tangibility. Earlier studies on non-regulated firms typically find that
tangibility has a positive effect on leverage, the logic being that tangible assets can serve as a
collateral and hence lower the cost of debt financing. In our sample however, fixed assets are highly
firm specific and non-redeployable (e.g., roads, airports, physical electricity or telecommunications
networks) and may therefore serve as poor collaterals. The coefficient on the Investor protection
index is negative though not significant at the conventional levels (the p-value is 13.1%), and
suggests that leverage tends to be lower in countries where investors’ rights are better protected and
investors are therefore more inclined to buy equity shares.
If we look at the effect of independent regulation on leverage in Column (1) we find that the
coefficient on IRA is positive and significant: the point estimate shows that the direct effect of IRA
across all firms is a leverage increase of 4.2 percent on average. The coefficient on Government
UCR is negative and also significant, suggesting that leverage decreases as the Government’s stake
in the regulated utility increases. Political Orientation is not significant. The lack of significance
might be due to the fact that there may be opposite effects of political orientation that have to be
disentangled in relation with the presence of an IRA.21
In Column (2) we estimate equation (6bis) to investigate whether the impact of independent
regulation on the financing decisions of utilities differs across different ownership structures and
with the Government’s political orientation. We therefore interact the IRA dummy with Government
UCR and, separately, with the Political Orientation index. The results show that the IRA has a
21

Analogously to the investment equation, we also use the continuous Regulatory Independence index instead of the
dichotomous IRA dummy. This variable turns out to be never significant and therefore we do not report the results
(available on request).
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positive coefficient that is highly significant, while the coefficient on Government UCR is still
negative but is now insignificant.

Finally, the coefficient α4 of the interaction of IRA with

Government UCR is negative and significant. This indicates that the effect of the IRA on leverage
is different across private and state ownership and, more precisely, that the increase in leverage due
to the IRA is smaller for utilities that are partially (or fully) owned by the state.
Turning to Political Orientation, we notice in Column (2) that the coefficient α3 is
significant and positively signed, suggesting that regulated firms tend to raise less (more) debt when
the Government is leftwing (rightwing), hence presumably more “pro-consumer” (“pro-firm”). This
result is consistent with the idea that regulated firms may be less inclined to use their capital
structure strategically to influence the regulator if the political stance is ideologically in favour of
low tariffs (pro-consumer) because they think it is less effective than it would be under a pro-firm
political regime (see, for example, Biais and Perotti, 2005). In contrast, if the government is more
pro-firm, then firms may think they have more room for manoeuvre to obtain higher tariffs, hence
that the strategic use of leverage is worthwhile. The IRA*Political Orientation interaction tests
whether the increase in leverage due to the presence of the IRA differs depending on the political
orientation of the government. We find in Column (2) that α5, the coefficient on the interaction, is
negative and significant, suggesting that the leverage increase is less pronounced when the
government is rightwing and pro-firm. (We already know that firms have higher leverage under a
rightwing government because we include the Political Orientation index as a standalone control
variable and this enters with a positive coefficient). The negative coefficient suggests that when the
IRA is in place the effect of political orientation on regulated utilities’ capital structure is weaker. It
is as though the drive to increase debt if the government is pro-firm becomes less strong when the
IRA is in place, thus suggesting that political interference is somewhat curbed by independent
regulation. 22
To further illustrate this finding we rely again on graphical evidence. For this purpose we
further estimate separately the specification with IRA interacted with Government UCR (Column 3)
and IRA interacted with Political Orientation (Column 4) from which we derive the partial effects
reported in Figures (5)-(8).23
In Figure (5) we observe how the marginal effect of the IRA changes – i.e. decreases - as the
ownership stake of the state increases. We can also gauge the effect of state ownership conditional
22

We also estimated the same specifications using Market leverage, defined as the ratio between financial debt (short
and long-term) and the sum of market value of equity and financial debt. As emphasized by Rajan and Zingales (1995)
the literature is mixed about whether one should use book or market leverage We found very similar results which
confirm that our findings are not influenced by the choice of the dependent variable. Results are available upon request.
23
To check whether cross effects exist among IRA, political orientation and state ownership we also estimated a
specification with the interaction IRA*PolOrient*Government UCR. We found that the interactive term was
insignificant.
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on the presence of the IRA by computing α2 + α4*IRA. In column (1) we found that the direct
average effect of state ownership is to decrease leverage. Figure (6) confirms that leverage drops
when the IRA is set in place. In Figure (7), we depict the partial effect of IRA on leverage,
conditional on changes in the political orientation of the government. In Figure (8), we graph the
effect of political orientation conditional on the presence of the IRA and we observe that the
increase in leverage due to the political interference reduces almost to zero when the IRA is in
place. One can easily compute that when IRA=1, α3 + α5*IRA = 0.023 – 0.035= - 0.012.
Our dynamic specification allows us to estimate the long run effect of the introduction of the
IRA on the leverage. We exploit the multiplier effect captured by the lagged leverage variable: if
we denote the coefficient of the lagged value of Leverage by β, then an increase in market leverage
by 1 percentage point in the short run translates into a long-run increase of 1+ β + β 2+ β 3+… =
1/(1- β) percentage points. At the bottom of the table we report the long run coefficients and their
significance levels. We find that the introduction of an IRA leads to a long run increase in the
leverage of 8.3 percentage points (Column 1). When we included the Government UCR*IRA
interacted term to explore cross-ownership differences, we found that the introduction of an IRA
induces, for utilities controlled by the state, not an increase but a decrease in the leverage. We can
quantify the long run effect on the book leverage by multiplying the estimated long run coefficient
(α4/(1-β) in Column 2) with a hypothetical change in the government’s ownership average stake
(0.348 from table 1). If we consider a sale of a 20% of stake by the Government (so that the new
state’s share decreases to approximately 15%), this change would generate a long run increase in
the book leverage of 4.4 percentage points (-0.22 * -0.20), quite a large increase. Since the average
book leverage from table 1 is 0.272, this would imply an increase to 0.316. If we instead consider a
full privatization of state’s utilities, so that the government’s stake decreases from 0.348 to 0, the
long run increase would be of 7.7 percentage points.

7. Conclusions and Implications
Over the last 20 years, regulatory competencies have been delegated to independent regulatory
authorities mainly to limit potential conflict of interest that surfaces when politicians directly or
indirectly control firms which manage essential services for citizens. The establishment of IRAs
has been typically seen as a way to improve the credibility of the regulatory commitments. It is
expected therefore that this new institutional arrangement, in turn, does affect the utilities
companies’ financial and investment choices. Still, politicians can influence the regulatory decision
according to their partisanship purposes and the government intervention could be more intense
22
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especially when utilities are (totally or partially) controlled by the State. Regulatory Independence,
the government’s political orientation and the State’s ownership are thus intertwined institutional
features that might affect firm’s real and financial decisions.
Notwithstanding the establishment of IRAs was a key institutional change in many
countries, the empirical literature on the effect of regulatory independence on utilities’ real and
financial decisions, and of its interaction with ownership and partisanship is scant, especially when
we consider the European scenario. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap.
Our results show that regulatory independence does matter for the financial as well as for
the investment decisions of our sample of 92 regulated EU firms from 1994 to 2005.
When an Independent Regulatory Agency is place, or more independent is the regulator,
investment increases. This result suggests that the creation of a new regulatory environment seems
to have contributed to create an environment which somewhat reduces the differences between
private and public performances. Public ownership does not display a significant impact, whereas
political orientation is found to matter also for investment decisions, as firm investment is higher
under more conservative (pro-firm) government. But this effect appears to revert when the IRA is in
place and the higher is regulatory independence.
When an IRA exists, financial leverage also increases, consistent with theories predicting a
strategic use of debt to influence regulators’ tariff setting decisions. Political orientation also affects
utilities’ financial decisions, as firms appear to have lower leverage under left-wing governments,
possibly because the strategic use of debt is ineffectual when the government is less pro-firm;
however, when the IRA is in place, political interference seems to be curbed.
Overall, the empirical findings for the leverage and the investment equations point to a
similar conclusion: when the IRA is set up, politics has a weaker impact on the financial and
investment decisions. Our results support the disciplining effect of independence in disentangling
regulatory intervention from political interference.
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Table 1 - Summary statistics –
92 publicly listed European regulated firms, 1994 – 2005.
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

No. Obs.

0.181
Market Leverage
0.272
Book Leverage
Real Total Asset (in millions of 2005
202,447
dollars)
9,262
Real Sales (in millions of 2005 dollars)
0.622
Tangibility
0.074
EBIT-to-Total Asset
1.416
Market-to-Book
0.052
Non-debt Tax Shield
0.348
Government’s UCR
0.111
Investment Rate
0.212
Debt-to-Capital Stock
0.775
Sales-to-Capital Stock
0.585
Independence Regulatory Agency dummy
0.616
Index of Regulatory Independence
5.662
Political Orientation

0.168
0.215

0
0

0.881
1

765
889

329,508
14,750
0.210
0.099
0.736
0.03
0.359
0.072
0.304
0.779
0.493
0.116
1.481

29,702
3,682
0.034
-1.948
0.572
0
0
0.000
0.000
0.023
0
0.36
3.665

205,179
80,226
0.967
0.299
14.176
0.183
1
0.674
3.356
5.500
1
0.83
8.025

891
891
890
871
767
891
891
703
719
720
720
503
720
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Table 2.1 – GMM Estimates of the Investment Euler Equation with independent regulation,
mixed ownership and political orientation
The dependent variable (I/K) is the investment rate measured as the ration between capital expenditures and capital stock at
replacement value. CF/K is the ration between operational cash flow and the capital stock at replacement value. Y/K is the
sales to capital stock (at replacement value) ratio while D/K is the financial debt to capital stock (at replacement value)
ratio. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an independent regulatory agency (IRA) is in place and equal to 0 otherwise.
Government’s UCR measures the ultimate control rights held by the government. Political orientation measures the
government’s political stance. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. Lagged values of righthand variables used as instruments: lagged levels are used in first-differences equations and lags of first-differenced
variables are used in levels equations. All regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests
the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals.. The Sargan-Hansen statistic
tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at
1%, 5% and 10%.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(I/K)t-1

0.930***
(0.128)

0.937***
(0.129)

0.885***
(0.089)

0.871***
(0.114)

(I/K)2t-1

-1.164***
(0.186)

-1.183***
(0.189)

-1.095***
(0.132)

-1.088***
(0.170)

(CF/K)t-1

-0.033
(0.039)

-0.023
(0.037)

-0.032
(0.061)

0.010
(0.066)

(Y/K)t-1

0.002
(0.006)

0.002
(0.006)

0.000
(0.003)

0.000
(0.003)

(Debt/K)2t-1

-

-

-0.002*
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.002)

IRAt-1 (α1)

0.015**
(0.007)

0.083**
(0.040)

0.017***
(0.006)

0.117**
(0.049)

Government UCR t-1 (α2)

0.004
(0.007)

0.001
(0.011)

0.005
(0.008)

0.138
(0.012)

Political Orientation t-1 (α3)

-0.000
(0.002)

0.008*
(0.005)

-0.002
(0.003)

0.009**
(0.005)

Government UCR t-1*IRA (α4)

-

0.009
(0.017)

-

-0.008
(0.019)

Political Orientation t-1*IRA (α5)

-

-0.013**
(0.007)

-

-0.018**
(0.008)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)

0.008
0.715

0.007
0.849

0.011
0.963

0.013
0.758

Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)

0.344

0.399

0.354

0.720

85 [457]

0.02
0.03
0.12
85 [457]

85 [439]

0.02
0.01
0.04
85 [438]

I/Kt

P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0
N. Firms [N. Obs.]
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Table 2.2 – GMM Estimates of the Investment Euler Equation with the degree of formal
regulatory independence
The dependent variable (I/K) is the investment rate measured as the ration between capital expenditures and capital stock at
replacement value. CF/K is the ration between operational cash flow and the capital stock at replacement value. Y/K is the
sales to capital stock (at replacement value) ratio while D/K is the financial debt to capital stock (at replacement value)
ratio. Government’s UCR measures the ultimate control rights held by the government. Reg Independence is an index of
formal regulatory independence (Gilardi, 2005). Political orientation measures the government’s political stance. Dynamic
panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. Lagged values of right-hand variables used as instruments: lagged
levels are used in first-differences equations and lags of first-differenced variables are used in levels equations. All
regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order [secondorder] correlation in the differenced residuals.. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%...

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(I/K)t-1

0.816***
(0.134)

0.823***
(0.122)

0.952***
(0.156)

0.948***
(0.140)

(I/K)2t-1

-1.063***
(0.191)

-1.054***
(0.176)

-1.247***
(0.232)

-1.242***
(0.214)

(CF/K)t-1

-0.076
(0.071)

-0.042
(0.084)

0.000
(0.070)

-0.014
(0.065)

(Y/K)t-1

-0.002
(0.004)

0.002
(0.003)

0.001
(0.003)

0.004
(0.003)

-

-

-0.006***
(0.002)

-0.005***
(0.002)

Reg Independence t-1 (α1)

0.166**
(0.082)

0.314**
(0.157)

0.113*
(0.060)

0.377**
(0.155)

Government UCR t-1 (α2)

-0.003
(0.013)

-0.015
(0.070)

0.005
(0.009)

0.018
(0.075)

Political Orientation t-1 (α3)

-0.003
(0.005)

0.028**
(0.014)

-0.002
(0.003)

0.034**
(0.013)

Government UCR t-1* Reg Independence (α4)

-

0.041
(0.117)

-

-0.005
(0.128)

Political Orientation t-1* Reg Independence (α5)

-

-0.051**
(0.026)

-

-0.060**
(0.024)

Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)

0.023
0.930

0.022
0.966

0.009
0.955

0.009
0.997

Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)

0.584

0.293

0.759

0.981

60 [302]

0.06
0.05
0.07
60 [302]

60 [344]

0.02
0.02
0.02
60 [345]

I/Kt

(Debt/K)2t-1

P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0
N. Firms [N. Obs.]
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Table 3 – GMM estimates of a Dynamic Leverage Equation with Independent Regulation
Mixed Ownership, and Political Orientation
The dependent variable is Book Leverage; it is defined as the ratio between financial debt (short and long-term) and the
sum of book equity and financial debt. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an independent regulatory agency (IRA) is in place and
is equal to 0 otherwise. Government’s UCR measures the ultimate control rights held by the government. Political
orientation measures the government’s political stance. Investor protection is the time-varying “antidirector rights” index
by Pagano and Volpin (2005). Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. Lagged values of righthand variables used as instruments: lagged levels are used in first-differences equations and lags of first-differenced
variables are used in levels equations. All regressions include year dummies. Year, sector and country dummies are
included as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial
correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] correlation in the differenced
residuals.. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, *
denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%.

Leveraget-1 (β)
Log of real total assets
Fixed-to-Total Assets
Non-debt Tax Shield
EBIT-to-Total Assets
GDP Growth
Investor Protection
IRA (α1)
Government UCR (α2)
Political Orientation (α3)
Government UCR *IRA (α4)
Political Orientation*IRA (α5)

α1/(1-β) (p-value)
α4/(1-β) (p-value)
α5/(1-β) (p-value)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.494***
(0.078)
0.014**
(0.005)
-0.104*
(0.061)
-0.928***
(0.292)
-0.301***
(0.086)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.028
(0.019)
0.042**
(0.019)
-0.082**
(0.039)
0.001
(0.005)
-

0.506***
(0.077)
0.015***
(0.005)
-0.098*
(0.060)
-0.909***
(0.283)
-0.294***
(0.084)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.300*
(0.018)
0.073***
(0.023)
-0.019**
(0.049)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.109
(0.049)
-

0.476***
(0.080)
0.014**
(0.005)
-0.110*
(0.061)
-1.061***
(0.328)
-0.304***
(0.087)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.035*
(0.018)
0.249**
(0.106)
-0.080**
(0.039)
0.023**
(0.011)
-0.035**
(0.017)

0.494***
(0.078)
0.016***
(0.006)
-0.103*
(0.060)
-1.016***
(0.310)
-0.297***
(0.085)
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.035**
(0.018)
0.248***
(0.096)
-0.015
(0.049)
0.021**
(0.010)
-0.112**
(0.049)
-0.030*
(0.015)

0.083** (0.04)
-

α1+α4 (p-value)
α1+α5 (p-value)
α3+α5 (p-value)
α2+α4 (p-value)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value)
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value)
N. Firms [N. Obs.]

0.000
0.169
0.261
92 [695]

-0.22**(0.015)
-0.22*** (0.01)
-0.066** (0.027)
0.346
0.003
0.000
0.163
0.240
92 [695]

0.017
0.173
0.000
0.168
0.406
92 [695]

0.007
0.335
0.004
0.000
0.162
0.280
92 [695]
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FIGURE 1 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF IRA ON IK AS POLITICAL ORIENTATION SHIFTS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT
Marginal Effect of IRA on IK as Political Orientation changes (95% confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 2 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION ON IK AS THE IRA IS SET IN PLACE
Marginal Effect of Political Orientation on IK as IRA is set in place (95% confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 3 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE ON IK AS POLITICAL ORIENTATION
SHIFTS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT

Marginal Effect of Regulatory Independence on IK as Political Orientation changes (95%
confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 4 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION ON IK AS REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE
INCREASES

Marginal Effect of Political Orientation on IK as Regulatory Independence increases
(95% confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 5 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF IRA ON LEV AS STATE OWNERSHIP INCREASES
Marginal Effect of IRA on LEV as State ownership increases (95% confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 6 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF STATE OWNERSHIP ON LEV WHEN THE IRA IS IN PLACE
Marginal Effect of State ownership on LEV as IRA is set in place (95% confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 7 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF IRA ON LEV AS POLITICAL ORIENTATION SHIFTS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT
Marginal Effect of IRA on LEV as Political Orientation changes (95% confidence intervals)
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FIGURE 8 - MARGINAL EFFECT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION ON LEV AS THE IRA IS SET IN PLACE
Marginal Effect of Political Orientation on LEV as IRA is set in place (95% confidence intervals)
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Appendix A1 – Variable definitions
Variable Definitions
Investment Rate
Book Leverage
Market Leverage
Total Assets (log)
Real sales (log)
Tangibility
EBIT-to-Asset
Non-Debt Tax Shield
Cash Flow to Capital Stock
Debt to Capital Stock
Sales to Capital Stock

Capital Expenditure/Capital Stock at replacement value
(Short and long term financial debt)/(Book Equity+ST+LT financial debt)
(Short and long term financial debt)/(Market Equity+ST+LT financial debt)
Log of real total assets
Log of real sales
Net fixed assets/ Total Assets
Earnings before interests and taxes/Total Assets
(Depreciation and amortization)/Total Assets
Cash Flow/Capital Stock at replacement value
(Short and long term financial debt)/Capital Stock at replacement value
Sales/ Capital Stock at replacement value
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Appendix 2 -The timing of regulation and privatization in the energy and telecommunications sectors in
European countries (EU27)
Electricity
Country
Austria

Date of establishing
an IRA
2001

Belgium

2000

Bulgaria

1999

Czech Rep.

2001

Cyprus

2003

Denmark

2000

Estonia

*

Finland

2000

France

2000

Germany
Greece

1998**

1994

Ireland

1999

Latvia
Lithuania
Luxemburg

Privatization
Year

Ownership at
end 2007

Date of establishing an
IRA

State 31%

1997
1991

-

State 100%

-

-

State 66%

-

-

State 100%

-

State 100%

2006

State 100%

2005

State 100%

2001**
1997

-

State 100%

-

1998

State 54%

2005

State 87%

2005

-

-

-

State 100%

Netherlands

1998

Poland

1997
1996
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*

State 30%
1995
2004
2005
-

Private

-

State 100%

1997

-

State 80%

-

State 100%

-

-

Private

1996

State 43%

-

State 28%

State 32%

-

1996

State 100%

2003

1996
1996
1993

1997

Private
(State 3%)

2001**

State 100%

2004

State 100%

2001

State 100%

2006
2001

State 58%
State 38%
Private^
Private

1994
1994
1998
1998

Private ^
State 51%
Private
State 100%
Private
Private (State
8%)

1997
1996

State 100%

1996

1997
-

Private

State 80%

State 31%

-

Private

Private

1997
State 33%

State 50%

State 60%

1992
1995

Ownership at
end 2007

1987

1997
2001

2002

Privatization
Year

2002

1997

Malta

Portugal

Ownership at
end 2007
State 51%

Telecommunications

2000

Hungary

Italy

Privatization
Year

Gas

2001
1995

Private
Private
(State 13%)
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Romania

1998

Slovenia

2000

Slovakia Rep.

2001

Spain

1998

Sweden

2008

UK

1989

-

State 100%

-

-

State 100%

-

-

State 100%

-

Private

State 100%

2006

State 100%

2001

State 100%

2004

Private

1996
1992

Private

Private

2006

State 46%
State 49%
State 74%
Private

2000

1984

State 60%
Private

* Since 1998 regulation is carried on by a branch of the Estonian Competition Authority. No an IRA specifically dedicated to regulated utilities.
** IRA for both energy and telecoms together. In Germany a dedicated IRA for energy sectors is expected in 2009
^ With Golden Shares
Source: International European Regulation Network (www.iern.net ) for energy markets and European Regulators Group (http://www.erg.eu.int/ ) for telecommunications
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